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APPRECIATE THE APPRECIATION:
IMPORTED INPUTS AND CONCERN
OVER DUTCH DISEASE  
Wardah Naim and Trevor Tombe†
SUMMARY
If anything is to blame for a higher dollar having negative effects on the Central Canadian
manufacturing sector, you are not likely to find it in any “Dutch Disease” supposedly caused
by Alberta’s oil sands. Contrary to popular belief, the higher value of the Canadian dollar may
even help Central Canadian manufacturers grow stronger, cut costs, and create jobs. 
The idea that a booming, commodity-driven dollar is hurting Canadian goods exports, afflicting
the country with so-called Dutch Disease, may be popular among certain politicians, including
federal Opposition leader Thomas Mulcair and former Premier of Ontario Dalton McGuinty, but
is not supported by the facts. It turns out that the simple economic theory these politicians
have in mind is incomplete.
A more thorough, data-driven look at the nation’s manufacturing sector reveals that Canadian
businesses rely very heavily on imported materials and equipment as inputs in the
manufacturing process. Canadian industry overall has one of the highest import ratios for
such intermediate goods in the OECD, roughly twice as high as that of the U.S., the European
Union and Japan. Compared to all other sectors, manufacturers are the heaviest users of
imported materials and equipment, with more than 40 per cent of their inputs coming from
other countries.
A higher dollar may make it more expensive for foreign buyers to purchase Canadian
manufactured goods, but that effect appears to be more than offset by the savings that
Canadian producers enjoy with a higher dollar that makes possible cheaper imported-inputs
and lower cost of production, which have a lowering effect on prices. The net result is that
Canadian manufacturers actually get more benefit from a higher dollar, and the regions that
get the biggest boost from it are the Central Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec.
Policy-makers looking to aid the Canadian economy as a whole, and the manufacturing sector
in particular, should stop worrying about Dutch Disease and, rather, welcome a higher
Canadian dollar. But more than that, they should design policies that are better tailored for an
economy that relies so heavily on imported intermediate inputs. Policy efforts would be far
better put to eliminating tariffs and other trade barriers that make imported inputs more
expensive, and thus hamper Canadian competitiveness. Policies should also focus on
improving productivity, by inviting foreign investment, rather than subtly discouraging it
through vehicles such as the Investment Canada Act. And certainly, anything that forces
businesses to “buy local,” as Ontario’s Green Energy Act requires, will only stand in the way of
Canadian businesses taking advantage of our higher dollar by importing lower-cost inputs
from abroad. If policy-makers want to help Canadian factories, they shouldn’t complain about
Alberta but instead focus on improving their domestic economic policies instead. 
† We would like to thank Jennifer Winter and three anonymous reviewers for their extremely
valuable comments and suggestions.
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DE L’IMPORTATION DES INTRANTS  
ET DU MAL HOLLANDAIS
Wardah Naim et Trevor Tombe†
RÉSUMÉ
S’il faut chercher le coupable des effets négatifs de la hausse du dollar sur le secteur manufacturier du centre du 
Canada, il est peu probable qu’on le trouve dans le « mal hollandais », prétendument causé par les sables bitumineux 
de l’Alberta. Contrairement à la croyance populaire, la valeur élevée du dollar canadien serait même de nature à 
renforcer les manufacturiers canadiens, à réduire leurs coûts et à créer des emplois.
L’idée qu’un dollar canadien en forte hausse, dopé par le prix des matières de base, nuit aux exportations 
canadiennes et inflige au pays le soi-disant « mal hollandais » peut plaire à certains politiciens, notamment le leader 
de l’opposition fédérale Thomas Mulcair et l’ancien premier ministre de l’Ontario Dalton McGuinty, mais rien dans 
les faits ne corrobore cette vision des choses. En fait, la théorie économique simple que ces politiciens ont à l’esprit 
est incomplète.
Un regard plus approfondi, fondé sur des données probantes dans le secteur de la fabrication au pays révèle que 
les entreprises canadiennes s’appuient très largement sur des biens et de l’équipement importés comme intrants 
dans les processus de fabrication. Dans l’ensemble, le taux d’importation de ces biens intermédiaires dans l’industrie 
canadienne est l’un des plus élevés des pays de l’OCDE, soit près du double de celui des États-Unis, de l’Union 
européenne et du Japon. Comparativement à tous les autres secteurs, les entreprises du secteur de la fabrication 
représentent les plus importants utilisateurs de biens et d’équipement importés, et plus de 40 % de leurs intrants 
proviennent d’autres pays.
Il se peut que la hausse du dollar fasse grimper le prix des biens fabriqués au Canada pour les acheteurs internationaux, 
mais cette situation semble plus que compensée par les économies que réalisent les producteurs canadiens quand la 
valeur élevée du dollar leur permet d’importer des intrants meilleur marché et de réduire les coûts de production, ce 
qui a pour effet d’abaisser les prix. En somme, les fabricants canadiens tirent un avantage net de la valeur élevée du 
dollar et les régions qui en profitent le plus sont les provinces du centre du Canada, l’Ontario et le Québec.
Les décideurs qui souhaitent venir en aide à l’ensemble de l’économie canadienne et au secteur manufacturier en 
particulier devraient cesser de se soucier du mal hollandais et accueillir la hausse du dollar comme un bienfait. Mais 
plus encore, ils devraient concevoir des politiques mieux adaptées à une économie qui s’appuie si lourdement sur les 
intrants intermédiaires importés. Il serait beaucoup plus profitable d’axer les efforts sur l’élimination des barrières 
tarifaires et douanières qui augmentent le prix des produits qui entrent dans le processus de fabrication et qui nuisent 
ainsi à la compétitivité du Canada. Les politiques devraient aussi mettre l’accent sur l’amélioration de la productivité 
et pour ce faire, stimuler l’investissement étranger plutôt que de l’affaiblir subtilement par des véhicules tels que 
la Loi sur Investissement Canada. Et il ne fait aucun doute que toute mesure qui force les entreprises à acheter « 
localement », par exemple la Loi sur l’énergie verte de l’Ontario, nuit à la capacité des entreprises canadiennes de 
tirer le meilleur parti possible d’un dollar dont le cours est élevé dans l’importation à meilleur prix des intrants. Si les 
décideurs souhaitent aider les usines canadiennes, ils devraient cesser de blâmer l’Alberta et améliorer plutôt leurs 
politiques économiques nationales.
† 
Nous souhaitons remercier Jennifer Winter et trois lecteurs anonymes pour leurs commentaires et leurs suggestions 
extrêmement utiles.
INTRODUCTION
The subject of currency appreciation and its effect on manufacturing productivity, output, and
employment has become an increasingly important topic for Canadian governments and policy-
makers. It is often claimed that an appreciation of the Canadian dollar — driven perhaps by a
booming commodity sector — will reduce manufacturing activity through lower demand for
Canadian exports. This phenomenon is referred to as “Dutch Disease.”1 For Dutch Disease to
exist, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) commodity price increases lead to the appreciation of
the currencies of commodity-exporting countries; and (2) an appreciating currency negatively
affects domestic manufacturers. In this paper, we make no attempt to investigate the first
condition, and focus all attention on the second condition. We will show that a currency
appreciation does not necessarily harm manufacturers — and, in certain situations, may even
benefit them. By extension, we also show that Ontario and Quebec — the two provinces widely
believed to be harmed by a higher dollar — stand to fare relatively better from a higher dollar
than the rest of Canada. 
The basic logic behind the claims that a higher dollar harms manufacturers is simple, though
incomplete. It is of course true that foreign buyers require Canadian dollars to purchase exported
Canadian manufactured products. So, as the dollar’s value increases, the effective cost to
purchase manufactured goods increases. This story, however, neglects an important aspect of
today’s increasingly interconnected global marketplace. Not only are final products traded, but
so are many intermediate inputs, such as materials, computers, or anything else used by
Canadian businesses.2 Recognizing that supply chains are now global can change how one
views the effect of a rising dollar. An appreciating currency decreases the cost of imported
inputs and, if imported inputs are used in large-enough volumes relative to other inputs, this
lowers overall production costs and, consequently, prices. With lower prices comes higher sales
volumes, and with that comes higher output and employment. While the benefits of imported,
lower-cost intermediate inputs are well recognized in the academic literature, they have received
little attention in the current policy debate on Dutch Disease; we hope to shed light on this issue.
Using high-quality data from the OECD, we estimate the importance of imported inputs for
various Canadian industries and provinces. We find that Canadian businesses import a
substantially larger fraction of their intermediate inputs than do firms in most other countries,
even within particular industries. The volume of imported intermediate inputs is also large
relative to other types of inputs. Canadian manufacturers, for example, import over 40 per cent
of all intermediate inputs used in production, which is equivalent in value to one quarter of total
output. For comparison, total labour compensation is equivalent to only 18 per cent of output.
We highlight the significance of these results with a model of Canada’s economy. This model is
deliberately simplified to illustrate as cleanly and clearly as possible how an appreciating
currency can lower the cost of imported inputs and, consequently, benefit manufacturers. We
find the benefits of cheaper access to imported inputs is so large that this effect can potentially
offset the negative effect of a higher dollar on manufacturing exports. 
1 We will abstract from other mechanisms through which a booming commodity sector affects manufacturing activity.
For example, increased demand for workers and other resources by commodity producers will increase wages and
prices for other inputs. These higher input prices will increase costs for manufacturers and cause a relative decline in
this sector.
2 The increasing importance of cross-border sourcing of inputs has been widely documented. For an excellent analysis
of this phenomenon, see David Hummels, Jun Ishii, and Kei-Mu Yi, “The Nature and Growth of Vertical
Specialization in World Trade,” Journal of International Economics 54(1) (2001): 75-96.
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We explore a number of scenarios and find that under some reasonable assumptions, a higher
dollar can actually lead manufacturing output to increase. This occurs since, under all
scenarios, manufacturing revenue will decline from a higher dollar, but the severity of the
decline will depend on the sensitivity of exports to exchange rates; we ground our model in
recent estimates of this sensitivity. When the export response to exchange rates is sufficiently
small, the revenue decline is smaller than the price decline (from cheaper inputs) and,
therefore, the quantity of output increases as the dollar rises. Using the simulated output
changes by sector, we derive a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the aggregate effect on the
GDP of each province. We find that, contrary to popular belief, Ontario and Quebec fare
relatively better than the rest of Canada in the face of an appreciating Canadian currency.
Given the model’s simplicity, however, we do not wish to claim too much. Our main goal, and
our ultimate conclusion based on this analysis, is that it is not clear (and perhaps even unlikely)
that a higher dollar is damaging to Canadian manufacturing and, by extension, to Ontario and
Quebec. Claims made by politicians and commentators regarding the negative effects of a
higher dollar amount to claims about the value of this elasticity, for which a precise and
indisputable estimate does not exist. While more research is clearly necessary, public
commentators should simply refrain from making claims without evidence — it lowers their
credibility and the quality of discourse in Canada.
In the next section, we will review the public debate over Dutch Disease in Canada and
examine some recent research on this issue. We will cover public commentary, policy-related
research, and academic research papers. The specific contribution of our paper will be made
clear. We provide detailed accounting of the importance of imported intermediate inputs in
Canada relative to other countries and for various industries. We use these data in developing a
simple model of Canada’s economy that incorporates imported inputs. We then use the model
to simulate the effect of a currency appreciation on economic activities across sectors and
provinces. Based on these results, we propose a number of policy recommendations.
BACKGROUND
Before proceeding further, a brief history of events and a summary of the existing research in
this area is in order. Research related to Dutch Disease varies from those who presume it exists
and investigate possible remedies3 to those that investigate whether Dutch Disease indeed
exists or not. Our review of the literature will focus on the latter research. We will examine
both public commentary and academic research. There is also concern that the rate of the
resource industry’s expansion will further deepen the regional economic disparities in Canada.4
We will not address these concerns directly, instead focusing on the effect of an appreciating
currency regardless of its underlying cause.
3 For example, see: Max W. Corden, “The Dutch Disease in Australia: Policy Options for a Three-Speed Economy”
(working paper 5/12, Melbourne Institute, 2012).
4 Nathan Lemphers and Dan Woynillowicz, “In the Shadow of the Boom: How Oilsands Development is Reshaping
Canada’s Economy,” The Pembina Institute (2012).
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3Concerns over Dutch Disease in Canada
The spark for this entire debate has been the steady increase in the value of the Canadian dollar
since 2002. We illustrate this dramatic rise in Figure 1, which plots the value of the Canadian
dollar relative to the American dollar, and relative to a broad basket of currencies belonging to
Canada’s trading partners. Following a decline from 1990 to 2002 the dollar dramatically rose
nearly 50 per cent between 2002 and 2011. While the dollar experienced a sharp dip during the
recent recession, it has since appreciated back around parity with the U.S. dollar. Much of this
appreciation may be due to the increasing global price of Canada’s principal commodity
exports. Since agricultural and fishing, forestry, and energy-related products account for over
one-third of Canada’s exports,5 increases in the price of these commodities increases the
demand for Canadian currency and, therefore, its value.
That being said, careful analysis yields conflicting conclusions. Some researchers find energy
prices account for much of Canada’s exchange-rate fluctuations.6 Other researchers, such as
Ferraro, Rogoff and Rossi,7 use different techniques and find the energy-price and exchange-
rate relationship to be only a short-term phenomenon. Whatever the true relationship, the
popular perception is that commodity price increases raise the value of the dollar and this
subsequently harms Canadian manufacturers.
FIGURE 1: VALUE OF THE CANADIAN DOLLAR OVER TIME
Note: This plots two measures of the value of the Canadian dollar over time: (1) The amount of U.S. dollars needed to
purchase one Canadian dollar; and (2) the inverse of Canada’s effective exchange rate. The effective exchange rate is
the trade-weighted average of Canada’s exchange rate with all its trading partners. Since 2002, there has been a
large and rapid appreciation of the Canadian dollar.
5 Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table 228-0043.
6 Michel Beine, Charles Bos and Serge Coulombe, “Does the Canadian Economy Suffer from Dutch Disease?”
Resource and Energy Economics 34(4) (2012): 468-492.
7 Ferraro, Domenico, Kenneth Rogoff and Barbara Rossi. “Can Oil Prices Forecast Exchange Rates?” National Bureau
of Economic Research, Working Paper 17998, 2012.
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Statements along this line have most recently, and most visibly, been made by Thomas Mulcair
(Leader of Canada’s Official Opposition) and by Dalton McGuinty (when he was Premier of
Ontario).8 Connecting the booming commodity sector (concentrated mainly in Canada’s western
provinces) to the rise in the Canadian dollar, the Opposition leader and Ontario’s then Premier
both claimed this would negatively affect manufacturing activity (concentrated mainly in the
central provinces of Quebec and Ontario). While it is obviously true that the decline in
manufacturing output and employment is correlated with dollar appreciation, it is questionable to
conclude from this data alone that any causal relationship exists. One cannot say the higher dollar
caused a decline in Canadian manufacturing merely because the two developments coincide.
Following the renewed interest among the Canadian public, some commentators have gained
headlines by claiming this relationship is indeed causal. The quality and quantity of the
evidence presented to support these claims is, unfortunately, limited. For instance, Andrew
Jackson, Senior Policy Advisor with the Broadbent Institute and a Professor at York University,
has publicly claimed that free trade has not increased productivity in Canada and that increased
production of natural resources lowers overall productivity.9 His evidence: (1) productivity has
declined since Canada’s free-trade deal with the United States and (2) the natural-resource
share of total exports has increased over the same period. This type of cum hoc ergo propter
hoc fallacy is very common and confuses cause with correlation.10 Private-sector economists
also make questionable public pronouncements without adequate (or any) evidence to support
their claims. In a recent Globe and Mail piece, Eric Lascelles, Chief Economist of RBC Global
Asset Management, claims that “almost three-quarters of the gap [between U.S. and Canadian
productivity] is due to the soaring loonie, which is out of control.”11 Some, such as United
Steelworkers’ economist Erin Weir, even suggest that the Bank of Canada should broaden its
mandate to protect Canadian exports from the negative effects of a strong dollar.12 He claims
businesses do not benefit from a higher dollar on the input side of their operations but are
squeezed on the export side; a point we will take direct issue with. 
Not all public commentary, however, has viewed a higher dollar negatively and there are some
who are skeptical of the Dutch Disease diagnosis for Canada. In a recent Financial Post
comment piece, Jack Mintz, Director of the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy,
points out that the decline in Ontario’s manufacturing sector is mirrored by very similar
declines in Ohio and Michigan.13 In fact, he points out, “manufacturing in Ontario, industrial
states, and the United States in general has been on a steady decline for 35 years.” This
declining trend has weathered the booms and busts of the resource sector during the ’70s and
’80s. Similarly, in a recent Macdonald-Laurier Institute commentary, Robert Murphy and Brian
Crowley argue that despite the existence of the Dutch Disease mechanism, other provinces
stand to benefit from the thriving petroleum industry.14 An expanding resource sector results in
increased demand for Canadian manufactured goods, potentially offsetting any losses from
8 See, for example: Gloria Galloway, “Mulcair digs in for long debate on ‘Dutch Disease’,” Globe and Mail, May 18,
2012; and Karen Howlett, “McGuinty rebuffs Redford’s oil-sands plea,” Globe and Mail, February 27, 2012.
9 Andrew Jackson, “Tarnished anniversary: Why the free-trade deal didn’t deliver,” Globe and Mail, October 5, 2012.
10 For serious, objective research identifying the effect of free trade on Canada’s productivity, see: Daniel Trefler, “The
Long and Short of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement,” The American Economic Review 94(4) (2004): 870-895.
11 Eric Lascelles, “Shrugging off Canada’s Competitiveness Shortfall,” Globe and Mail, May 18, 2012.
12 Erin Weir, “It’s time to broaden Bank of Canada’s mandate.” Globe and Mail, August 21, 2012.
13 Jack Mintz, “No Dutch Disease Here,” National Post, March 2, 2012.
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lower foreign demand due to a higher currency. Skepticism exists even among Canada’s
leading policy-makers. In a recent speech in Calgary, Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney
stated that Canada’s economy is too diverse to be plagued by such a phenomenon.15
In the context of this ongoing debate, we will present another side to the Dutch Disease story
and highlight a typically ignored positive benefit of Canada’s higher dollar: cheaper access to
imported inputs. We will illustrate the causal relationships clearly and estimate the potential
benefits of imported inputs with the aid of a simple model that is consistent with general
features of the Canadian economy. We side strongly with those who are skeptical of Dutch
Disease in Canada.
The Existing Academic Research
There have been various studies looking at the effect of currency fluctuations on manufacturing
and exporter performance. Given the breadth of this literature, we do not review it here.16 It is
clear, however, that previous research has not quantified the potential benefits of a higher
dollar in terms of cheaper access to import inputs. 
We are not the first, of course, to study imported inputs. Linda Goldberg and Jose Campa,17
for instance, document the importance of imported intermediate inputs for determining the
effect of exchange-rate fluctuations on consumer prices. As explained above, a higher dollar
decreases the cost of imported inputs used by domestic producers, who then lower their output
prices. These researchers find this channel is the most important factor behind the exchange
rate’s effect on overall consumer prices. They also document the extent of imported inputs for
a broad set of industries for a number of countries, though not for Canada. We derive similar
estimates for the Canadian economy, disaggregating our results by province and industry,
where possible. We find not only, as they do, that domestic prices fall following an
appreciation of the dollar, but that manufacturing output may (potentially) rise as well.
Mary Amiti and Jozef Konings18 investigate a similar gain from lower tariffs on imported
intermediate inputs for Indonesian manufacturing firms. They find that for a 10-percentage-
point reduction of intermediate input tariffs, productivity increases by 12 per cent for firms that
import inputs. Pinelopi Goldberg and co-authors19 find similar gains from imported inputs for
Indian firms. In particular, they find significant gains from access to new input varieties rather
than just cheaper access to existing varieties used by firms. In the Canadian context, Alla 
14 Murphy, Robert and Brian Lee Crowley. “No Dutch Treat: Oil and Gas Wealth Benefits All of Canada.” Macdonald-
Laurier Institute, 2012.
15 Mark Carney, “Dutch Disease,” speech to the Spruce Meadows Round Table (Calgary, Alberta), September 7, 2012.
Full text available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/2012/09/speeches/dutch-disease.
16 For interested readers, see: Baldwin and Krugman (1989), Jorion (1991), Bodnar and Gentry (1993), Clarida (1997),
Campa and Goldberg (1997, 1999), Nucci et al. (2001), Griffin and Stulz (2001), and Greenaway et al. (2007),
among many others.
17 Linda Goldberg and Jose Manuel Campa, “The Sensitivity of the CPI to Exchange Rates: Distribution Margins,
Imported Inputs, and Trade Exposure,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 92(2) (2010): 392-407.
18 Mary Amiti and Jozef Konings, “Trade Liberalization, Intermediate Inputs, and Productivity: Evidence from
Indonesia,” American Economic Review 97(5) (2007): 1611-1638.
19 Pinelopi Goldberg, Amit Khandelwal, Nina Pavcnik and Petia Topalova, “Imported Intermediate Inputs and
Domestic Product Growth: Evidence from India,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(4) (2010): 1727-1767.
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Lileeva and Daniel Trefler20 find that reductions in tariffs on inputs used by Canadian firms
purchased from the United States, due to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, resulted in
higher manufacturing productivity (though smaller than the gains for developing countries
cited above). Many other studies link substantial gains from trade liberalization to access to
foreign inputs by domestic firms.21 We will abstract from a number of additional benefits of
increased access to imported inputs, ranging from increased demand for skilled labour,22
technology transfer,23 and increased firm investment.24 We depart from these studies to show
another benefit of imported-input use: reducing (and potentially eliminating) the symptoms of
Dutch Disease. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF IMPORTED INPUTS FOR CANADA
The lack of attention paid to imported inputs in the current debate may be due to a lack of
information on their importance to Canadian firms. Linda Goldberg and Jose Campa, in
another paper,25 document the importance of imported intermediate inputs for many countries,
but not for Canada. We follow their approach and provide these important estimates for the
Canadian economy. Specifically, we provide estimates of the share of total inputs that are
imported, separately by sector. The OECD Database for Structural Analysis (STAN) is our
main source of data. It covers 33 OECD countries and 15 non-member countries. For Canada,
the data cover the years 1995, 2000, and 2005.
Estimating the imported-input use by sector is not trivial. The OECD infers an industry’s
imported-input use from data on individual goods (such as wood) used by each industry and the
aggregate (national) import share for those goods. That is, sector-specific information on actual
imports are not known but are instead inferred good-specific imports that are known. While this
is a limitation of the data, a direct measure of imported materials by sector is not available.26
Mathematically, industry-i’s total imports of intermediate inputs (denoted, mi) is inferred from
data on the whole economy’s imports of a given good-g (mg), total domestic use of good-g as
inputs (∑ i= 1x ig), and industry-i’s own purchases of good-g using the following equation:
mi = ∑ g = 1 (∑ i = 1x ig)
We rely on this estimation method in all that follows.
20 Alla Lileeva and Daniel Trefler,“Improved Access to Foreign Markets Raises Plant-level Productivity … For Some
Plants,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(3) (2010): 1051-1099.
21 For more, see Kugler and Verhoogen (2009); Kandilov and Leblebicioglu (2011); Nataraj (2011); Topalova and
Khandelwal (2011); Bilgin et al. (2012); Crino (2012); or Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2012).
22 Rosario Crino, “Imported Inputs and Skill Upgrading,” Labour Economics, forthcoming. Available online August 20,
2012.
23 Huseyin Bilgin, Marco Lau and Gokhan Karabulut, “Technology Transfer and Enterprise Performance: A Firm-Level
Analysis in China,” Journal of Business Economics and Management 13(3) (2012): 489-498.
24 Ivan Kandilov and Asli Leblebiciogl, “Trade Liberalization and Investment: Firm-Level Evidence from Mexico,”
World Bank Economic Review 26(2) (2011): 320-349.
25 Linda Goldberg and Jose Manuel Campa, “The Sensitivity of the CPI to Exchange Rates: Distribution Margins,
Imported Inputs, and Trade Exposure” (2010).
26 For a detailed discussion of this issue, and a more direct measure for the United States, see: Robert Feenstra and J.
Bradford Jensen, “Evaluating Estimates of Materials Offshoring from US Manufacturing,” Economics Letters 117
(2012): 170-173.
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Using the OECD STAN database, we plot the fraction of intermediate inputs that are imported
for a large set of countries in Figure 2a. This does not cover all countries, just the ones for
which OECD data are readily available. At first glance, it may seem that Canada is an entirely
typical country, right in the middle, with an intermediate import ratio of approximately 23 per
cent. However, the European Union countries are typically small and have nearly free trade
across borders, and when they are aggregated in Figure 2b, Canada is revealed to have one of
the highest fractions of imported intermediate goods. Our import ratio for intermediate goods is
more than twice as much as that of the European Union (eight per cent) and the United States
(10 per cent), almost twice as high as that of Japan (12 per cent), and larger than other
economies such as Brazil, Australia, China, or India. The Canadian economy imports a higher-
than-average proportion of its intermediate goods.
Further disaggregating the import ratio to the industry level reveals even more about the
Canadian economy. Canada’s manufacturing industry, for example, has the highest imported-
input ratio, with over 40 per cent of its inputs being imported. This is followed by the mining,
oil and gas extraction industry, which imports a little over 30 per cent of its inputs, and the
accommodation and food services sector, which imports roughly 20 per cent of inputs. We plot
all industries in Figure 3a. These three industries feature imported-input ratios that are
significantly greater than the average of 12 per cent. At the other end of the spectrum, the
construction industry, health and social services sector, utilities sector, and finance, insurance,
leasing and real estate industry all import less than five per cent of their inputs.
FIGURE 2: FRACTION OF TOTAL INTERMEDIATE INPUTS IMPORTED, BY COUNTRY (MID-2000S)
(a) OECD Countries
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(b) All Countries in STAN Database (EU Aggregated)
Source: Authors’ calculations from the OECD STAN Database.
FIGURE 3: IMPORTANCE OF IMPORTED INPUTS AND EXPORTED OUTPUT, BY INDUSTRY (2005)
(a) Imported-Input Share of Total Inputs
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Note: NAICS 81 and 91 are excluded. The simple average across industries is marked in red.
To put these figures in perspective, we contrast the imported-input shares with the share of each
sector’s output that is exported. Mining, oil and gas extraction, for example, exports the highest
share of its total output, 53 per cent, whereas the manufacturing sector exports approximately 49
per cent of its total output. We plot the export shares for all industries in Figure 3b. Even though
these industries export a large portion of their output, they are also heavy importers of
intermediate goods. If some industries feel the pinch of the higher dollar through decreases in
exports, they also stand to benefit from the higher dollar through decreases in the costs of
imported intermediate goods. Transport and warehousing and agriculture, forestry, fishing and
hunting are the only two other industry groups that export a higher-than-average portion of their
output. However, these two industry groups import only a modest portion of their inputs: eight
per cent and seven per cent, respectively. These are two channels through which exchange rates
affect industry output, and the effect seems to vary by industry.
THE EFFECT OF CURRENCY APPRECIATION ON THREE BROAD SECTORS
To quantify the effect of exchange-rate changes on output, we developed a simple model of
Canada’s economy that corresponds to an aggregation of all industries into three broad sectors:
primary, manufacturing, and services. We treat the rest of the world as exogenous and set the
various parameters of the model to reflect data on the Canadian economy (more detail on this
to follow). Using this model, we perform various counterfactuals to examine the effect of
(exogenous) exchange-rate changes on (1) the output prices of each sector, (2) the total revenue
of each sector, and (3) the real (quantity of) output produced by each sector.
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We focus on this simplified model since we are not interested in producing a precise estimate
of the effect of exchange-rate changes on Canadian economic activity. Such an estimate would
require a much more complex model, such as the Terms of Trade Economic Model developed
and maintained by the Bank of Canada. Instead, we wish to illustrate the quantitative
importance of imported intermediate inputs, as intuitively and clearly as possible, to advance
the quality and direction of current policy debates. In our simplified model, we also abstract
from any link between commodity prices and exchange rates. As stated earlier, our focus is on
the effect of currency changes on manufacturing output. If there is no link here, then Dutch
Disease cannot be a concern regardless of whether commodity price increases contribute to
currency appreciation.
The model’s basic structure is straightforward. In each of the three sectors, firms use
intermediate inputs from both domestic and foreign sources. Revenue is earned through sales
of final output to domestic consumers for final consumption; to other domestic producers for
use as intermediate inputs; and to customers abroad (exports). The exchange rate influences the
price for imported intermediates and the level of total exports. We adopt a simple view of
consumers and presume they allocate total income in fixed proportions between the three
sectors, since our goal is to present the simplest possible model to highlight the potential
importance of imported intermediate inputs.
A higher currency value will have two main effects in our model: (1) it will decrease the
effective price of any imported inputs, which lowers production costs and prices; and (2) it will
decrease total exports, as it becomes more expensive for customers abroad to purchase
Canadian goods. Which effect ends up dominating will depend on how sensitive foreign
customers are to the exchange rate. If export volumes decline significantly in response to an
appreciating Canadian dollar, then the second effect will dominate the first. The overall effect
of an appreciating currency would, therefore, be negative. On the other hand, if export volumes
are not so sensitive, then the first effect will dominate, and the overall effect would be positive.
Finally, we explicitly incorporate input-output links between sectors, as they are an important
source of additional gains. To see this, consider a sector that spends 10 per cent of its revenue
on imported inputs. Abstracting from input-output linkages will mean that a 10-per-cent
increase in the currency’s value will decrease costs by one per cent. When input-output
linkages are considered, the one-per-cent initial cost reduction is compounded by firms that
purchase this sector’s output for use as their own intermediate inputs. To be clear, production
costs decline due to the lower cost of imported inputs as well as the lower costs of inputs from
domestic sources that also benefited from cheaper imported inputs. This can be viewed as a
multiplier effect that magnifies the initial cost-reducing effect of the higher dollar. Using the
OECD data, we find manufacturers use 56 per cent of inputs from other manufacturers, half of
which are imported. Primary sector firms get 30 per cent of their inputs from manufacturers, 36
per cent of which are imported. Finally, service sector firms get 27 per cent of their inputs from
the manufacturers, 33 per cent of which are imported. The primary sector gets 40 per cent of its
inputs from the service sector and 30 per cent from other primary firms. We highlight the
important features of the data in Table 1 and use the reported values to calibrate the model, to
which we now turn.
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The Main Structure of the Model
The economy is composed of three sectors: primary, p; manufacturing, m; and services, s. A
representative firm in each sector-i uses labour (Li), capital (Ki) and intermediate inputs (Xij
denotes domestic inputs from sector-j and Mi imported inputs) using the constant returns to
scale technology
(1) Yi = AiKiαik Liαil Xipαip Ximαim Xisαis MiαiM ∀i∈ {p, m, s}
where α’s denote input shares, which are sector-specific and sum to one within each sector, and
Ai is sector-i’s total factor productivity (a measure of how much output is produced for a given
bundle of inputs).
Producers sell their output in a perfectly competitive market, which implies the price charged
will equal marginal production costs. Inputs are also purchased in a perfectly competitive
market. To purchase intermediate inputs from abroad (Mi), firms must first exchange domestic
currency for foreign currency. So, the effective price of imported inputs is given by PM = PMe,
where PM is the price charged by foreign producers, denominated in their own currency, and e
is the exchange rate or the inverse of the Canadian currency value. We will treat the Canadian
economy as sufficiently small relative to foreign markets so that PM is constant and not affected
by any changes in the model.
Labour is inelastically supplied, with total supply normalized to one, and is this economy’s
numeraire good, which implies w = 1. This means that all variables in the economy, such as
prices and revenue, are expressed relative to total labour compensation. Finally, credit markets
will be global in nature and capital is perfectly mobile, which allows us to treat the cost of
capital (denoted r) as fixed.
The Exchange Rate’s Effect on Prices
With a perfectly competitive market structure, the price each sector charges for its output will
equal marginal costs of production,
(2) Pi = Ai (αik)
αik (αil)
αil (αip)
αip (αim)
αim (αis)
αis (αiM)
αiM ∀i∈ {p, m, s}
This equation says that the output price a given industry charges will decrease with that
industry’s productivity and increase with the prices of various inputs. Wages and the interest
rate are the prices of the primary inputs labour and capital, respectively. The price charged by
other sectors for their output that are used as inputs are given by Pp (for primary), Pm (for
manufacturing), and Ps (for services). The price charged by foreign producers for their output is
given by PM. Any decrease in these inputs prices will decrease the price charged by sector-i
and the strength of this pass-through is governed by the importance of the given inputs in
production (that is, by the input shares, α).
f
f
f
1 r w Pp Pm Ps PM
To see the effect of changes in the exchange rate on prices in each sector, take the ratio of
equation (2) after an exchange rate change with its original value to yield
(3) Pi = Ppαip Pmαim Psαis PMαiM ∀i∈ {p, m, s}
where hats denote gross percentage changes. Notice that all terms that do not change with time
(wages, interest rates, productivity, and some of the input share terms) are cancelled. This
means price changes in each sector are only a function of price changes in all other sectors and
the change in the price of imported intermediates. When the exchange rate changes (ê), the
price of imported intermediate inputs will change (denoted by the PM), since the price charged
by the foreign producer is fixed. For example, if the dollar rises by 20 per cent, from parity to
$1.20 USD/CDN, the price of imported intermediates will change by PM = ê = 1/1.2. So, with
PM replaced by ê, we now have a system of three equations and three unknowns as a function
of the change in the price of imported intermediate inputs due to exchange rate changes. One
may be concerned that the above specifications assume perfectly competitive firms but
equation (3) and the results that follow will still hold even if firms earn profits so long as their
markup is a fixed percentage of revenue.
This is a simple means of simulating and illustrating the effect of exchange-rate changes
through to output prices of three broad industries in Canada. The simplicity is achieved since
price changes of each sector are a function of exchange-rate changes only, and we do not need
values for wages, interest rates, or sectoral productivity. This eases the data requirements and
allows our results to be valid under a variety of general models. We only require data on the
input shares by sector, which we base on data outlined in the previous section. We report the
values for each of the input shares (α) in Table 1. Using these values, we simulated a variety of
exchange-rate changes and report the effect on each sector’s price in Figure 4. 
TABLE 1: INPUT SHARES BY SECTOR
Note: This reports the various input shares for each broad sector in Canada. Values are estimated from the OECD STAN
dataset as the ratio of spending on each type of input to each sector’s output.
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ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
Primary 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.07
Manufacturing 0.11 0.20 0.15 0.25
Services 0.01 0.07 0.26 0.06
Domestic Inputs Foreign
Primary Manufacturing Services Inputs
αip αim αis αiM
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
FIGURE 4: SIMULATED CHANGE IN OUTPUT PRICES, FOR VARIOUS EXCHANGE RATES
Note: Reports the relative output price for each of the three sectors over various exchange rates. All values are reported
relative to Dollar parity between Canada and the United States.
If the dollar appreciates by 20 per cent, the price of manufactured goods declines by more than
six per cent (regardless of whether the dollar’s value appreciates from $0.75 to $0.90 against
the U.S. dollar, or from $1.00 to $1.20). The price of output from the other two sectors falls by
only two per cent. This follows from the heavy reliance of manufactured goods on imported
intermediate inputs. The reverse is a similar, but opposite, effect. If the dollar declines to $0.80,
from parity ($1.00), prices for manufactured goods will rise by eight per cent, while the prices
of the other sectors rise by less than three per cent. Note that these price changes result only
from the use of imported intermediate inputs that become cheaper as the dollar value rises. If
this channel is ignored, as it is with most investigations into the effect of exchange-rate
changes on manufacturing activity, there would be no change in prices of any of the sectors in
response to a change in the dollar.
Determining the effect of these price changes on overall output requires that additional
structure be placed on the model. We turn to this issue next. Intuitively, though, note that there
are two opposing forces that determine the effect of exchange-rate changes on a sector’s
quantity of output: (1) lower prices from a higher dollar will increase sales (including exports);
and (2) a higher dollar will decrease export demand for the sector’s output. We know the
strength of the first channel, but must turn to a more detailed model to investigate them both
together. We explore a variety of scenarios, disciplined by various empirical estimates of the
strength of the second channel.
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The Exchange Rate’s Effect on Revenue
Total revenue of each sector is derived from domestic consumers that directly consume the
final output (Di), intermediate input spending by other sectors (αpi PpYp +αmi PmYm +αsi PsYs),
and foreign demand (Ei). Combined, we express total revenue of sector-i as27
(4) PiYi = Di  +αpi PpYp +αmi PmYm +αsi PsYs + Ei ∀i∈ {p, m, s}
With aggregate labour supply fixed and wages equal to 1 (see our earlier discussion) we can
replace domestic demand (Di  = di wL) with the fraction of consumer expenditure allocated to
sector-i (di ). We assume consumers in Canada spend two-thirds of income on domestic
producers, split 0.05, 0.2, and 0.75 between primary, manufacturing, and service sectors
respectively. That is, dp = 0.03, dp = 0.13, and ds = 0.5. We set exports to match the export
share of each sector’s overall revenue found in the OECD data. As before, we have a system of
three equations (one for each sector) and three unknowns (the revenue for each sector). The
effect of exchange-rate changes on a sector’s total revenue will operate through total export
demand (Ei). A higher dollar value will (potentially) decrease total revenue.28
The sensitivity of export flows to the exchange rate is an empirical question where existing
research can shed light; we rely on these existing estimates. Mariana Colacelli,29 for instance,
finds in a recent working paper that a 10-per-cent appreciation of a typical high-income
country’s currency will lower exports by 1.3%. If we followed this estimate, we would adjust
Ei such that ∂Ei = -0.13. Unfortunately, there is a large variance in the estimated elasticity
across studies. Seven studies conducted between 1951 and 1985 for Canada are reviewed by
Hooper and Marquez.30 The elasticities in these studies range within [-1.37, 0.80],31 which
imply that a 10-per-cent appreciation could lead export volumes to decline by 13.7 per cent or
to increase by eight per cent; this is an unfortunately larger variance in potential outcomes.
While the most recent, and sophisticated, estimate of Colacelli32 suggests -0.13 is an
appropriate elasticity, we will present results from the model with an elasticity of 0.00, -0.25,
-0.50, -0.75, and -1.00. Using these elasticity estimates, we determine each sector’s revenue for
the alternative values of the exchange rate by varying the level of exports and re-solving
27 As before, one may be concerned that this assumes a zero markup by producers. This may be a particular concern for
the primary sector, as producers there may earn rents. For a constant markup of price over marginal costs for primary
producers (denoted m>1), assuming all rents were rebated lump-sum to households, Di would equal
di = (wL + (1 - m-1)Pv Yv). So, equation (4) would become 
PiYi = di + (αpi m-1 + di (1 - m-1)) PvYv + αmi PmYm + αsi PsYs + Ei. To set the value of m, operating profit margins
for the primary sector reported in Statistics Canada’s Quarterly Financial Statements for Enterprises (Catalogue 61-
008-XWE) was 9% in the 4th quarter of 2011, suggesting m = 1.09. All results are robust to various assumptions of
the magnitude of m. Results from these exercises are available upon request.
28 Value-added and total revenue are proportional in this framework. We therefore focus our attention and results on
revenue changes. Also, there is no notion of a “firm” in this model. So, we cannot make a statement about how a
sector’s revenue change will affect the number or scale of firms. 
29 Mariana Colacelli, “Export Responses to Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations: Development Status and Exported Good
Effects,” working paper, Barnard College, Columbia University, 2008.
30 Peter Hooper and Jaime Marquez, “Exchange Rates, Prices, and External Adjustment in the United States and
Japan,” International Finance Discussion Paper No. 456, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1993.
31 The mean across the studies is 0.46, with one finding zero and another finding positive 0.80.
32 Mariana Colacelli, “Export Responses to Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations: Development Status and Exported Good
Effects,” 2008.
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equation (4), holding all other parameters fixed. We do not simulate the positive elasticity case
since, if it were true, a higher dollar would both increase export revenue and decrease prices.
This would be an unambiguously positive outcome for the firms involved and our purpose is to
determine under what conditions a rising dollar will increase the quantity of output even if
export revenues decline.
FIGURE 5: SIMULATED REVENUE CHANGES FOR VARIOUS EXPORT ELASTICITIES
(a) Export Elasticity of 0.00 (b) Export Elasticity of -0.25
(c) Export Elasticity of -0.50 (d) Export Elasticity of -1.00
Our simulated revenue responses are reported in Figure 5 and in Table 2. We find that a higher
dollar lowers each sector’s revenue, since exports decline. In manufacturing, revenue declines
by three per cent following a 20 per cent appreciation of the dollar when the elasticity of
exports is -0.25. Revenue declines by nearly 13 per cent when the elasticity is set at -1.0. For
perspective, 13 per cent of manufacturing output (assuming constant labour productivity) is
associated with nearly 200,000 workers.33 Without recognizing that imported intermediate
inputs become cheaper following a dollar appreciation, one would conclude the revenue
change equals the output change. In this case, a significant appreciation of Canada’s currency
could have potentially large negative effects on manufacturing output and employment. That
being said, taking account of changing output prices can dramatically alter this conclusion.
33 Source: Canadian Industry Statistics, Industry Canada. Total employment in NAICS 31-33 was 1,480,010 in 2010.
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TABLE 2: EFFECT OF A 20% DOLLAR APPRECIATION
Note: Reports the simulated change in prices, revenue, and output for the three main sectors of the Canadian economy in
response to a 20% appreciation of the dollar. Given the market structure and production technologies assumed,
value-added is proportional to total revenue. So, percentage changes in revenue reported in Column 2 are also
percentage changes in firm value-added. The equation governing the relationship between the columns is: 1+%
change in output = (1+% change in revenue) ÷ (1+% change in price).
The Exchange Rate’s Effect on the Quantity of Output
The change in a sector’s real output (that is, the quantity of output) is given by the change in
revenue removing the effect of the change in price. Price declines will lower revenue even if
output (and, therefore, employment) is unchanged. For example, as we saw in Figure 4,
manufactured-goods prices decline by more than six per cent following a 20-per-cent dollar
appreciation. So, if revenues decline by 13 per cent, but output prices decline six per cent, then
output (as a quantity) declines by only seven per cent. If revenues decline by six per cent (as
they do in the case of an elasticity equal to -0.50), then the six-per-cent output-price reduction
completely accounts for that change; output, in this case, is not affected by the dollar’s
appreciation. For a range of elasticities, we calculate the output (quantity) change and report
the results in Figure 6 and in the last column of Table 2. When the elasticity is -0.25, the output
actually rises by over three per cent, since the price decline is larger than the revenue
reduction. For an elasticity of -1.0, output declines by only six per cent following a 20-per-cent
appreciation — less than half the effect than if price reductions are ignored. By incorporating
imported intermediate inputs, which become cheaper with a higher dollar, the effect of an
appreciation is significantly mitigated.
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Exchange Rate Elasticity of Exports = 0.00
Primary -2.29 0.00 2.24
Manufacturing -6.62 0.00 6.21
Services -2.14 0.00 2.09
Exchange Rate Elasticity of Exports = 0.25
Primary -2.29 -3.26 -0.95
Manufacturing -6.62 -3.09 3.31
Services -2.14 -1.01 1.11
Exchange Rate Elasticity of Exports = 0.50
Primary -2.29 -6.59 -4.20
Manufacturing -6.62 -6.22 0.37
Services -2.14 -1.99 0.15
Exchange Rate Elasticity of Exports = 0.75
Primary -2.29 -9.97 -7.50
Manufacturing -6.62 -9.40 -2.61
Services -2.14 -2.94 -0.79
Exchange Rate Elasticity of Exports = 1.00
Primary -2.29 -13.41 -10.86
Manufacturing -6.62 -12.62 -5.64
Services -2.14 -3.87 -1.70
% Change
Sector Price Revenue Output
The critical elasticity, where changes in the dollar can affect real output levels, is -0.5. That is,
unless total exports are more sensitive to exchange rates than this (elasticity between -0.50 and
-1.00, for example), a rising dollar is not expected to lower the output of manufacturers in
Canada. Since there is (some) empirical evidence that the sensitivity can exceed this level, we
do not wish to conclude that Dutch Disease cannot exist in Canada. There is other evidence,
though, suggesting the sensitivity is much smaller than this level. Colacelli34 suggests it can be
as low as -0.13. If true, then a higher dollar can be expected to increase manufacturing output
(and employment) in Canada even if revenue falls. 
FIGURE 6: SIMULATED OUTPUT (QUANTITY) CHANGES FOR VARIOUS EXPORT ELASTICITIES
(a) Export Elasticity of 0.00 (b) Export Elasticity of -0.25
(c) Export Elasticity of -0.50 (d) Export Elasticity of -1.00
Note: This displays the quantity of output (revenue per unit price) for various degrees of export sensitivity to exchange-rate
changes. For small elasticities, dollar appreciation results in greater price reductions than revenue reductions. This
implies the quantity of output can actually increase from a higher-value dollar. For higher degrees of sensitivity, dollar
appreciation results in greater revenue reductions than price reductions and output quantity declines. Whether Dutch
Disease is a problem for Canadian manufacturing depends on the degree of export sensitivity to the exchange rate.
34 Mariana Colacelli, “Export Responses to Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations: Development Status and Exported Good
Effects,” 2008.
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The Effect of Currency Appreciation on Each Province
The Dutch Disease debate in Canada is often expressed in regional terms (west vs. east). To
shed light on this aspect of the debate, we can provide a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the
province-by-province effect based on the previous results for three broad sectors. Intuitively, if
a province’s economic activity is more heavily concentrated in manufacturing activities, then it
is more likely to benefit from an appreciating currency since this sector imports a great deal of
its inputs. A province that is concentrated in primary sector activities exports a lot, but imports
fewer inputs, and so will likely be relatively harmed from a currency appreciation. We use the
results calculated for three broad sectors in the previous section to extrapolate the effect on a
province’s overall GDP.
Specifically, we use data on the share of each province’s GDP accounted for by each sector.
With this, we assume each sector experiences the same gain or loss from appreciation as we
simulated nationally in Section 4. We can then extrapolate each province-j’s GDP change based
on
(5) %ΔGDPj = sjp yp + sjm ym + sjs ys 
where sjp is primary sector share of GDP in province-j and yp is the percentage change in
output for the primary sector that we previously calculated (see column 3 of Table 2); the
remaining variables (sjm , ym, sjs , ys) are defined similarly. Data on provincial GDP by sector are
readily available from Statistics Canada and we use that to calculate sjp , sjm , and sjs. In 2005,
manufacturing activities accounted for one-fifth of GDP in Ontario and Quebec, while, at the
other extreme, manufacturing constituted only five per cent of Newfoundland’s GDP. In
Alberta and Saskatchewan, manufacturing accounted for less than 10 per cent of the economy.
Newfoundland and Saskatchewan each derived more than one-quarter of their GDP from the
primary sector and Alberta was nearly as high. There is clearly much regional variation in the
underlying structure of economic activity in Canada.
With these values, we solve equation (5) above for each province and report the results in
Figure 7. Each figure corresponds to a different export elasticity, as before. If the export
response to an appreciated currency is low (0.25), then each province stands to benefit. On
average, provincial GDPs will increase by more than one per cent. Ontario and Quebec stand
to gain the most (at 1.5 per cent) as they are more heavily engaged in manufacturing activities.
Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland gain 0.8 per cent, 0.7 per cent, and 0.6 per cent
respectively. For higher elasticities, each province is more likely to experience GDP losses, but
Ontario and Quebec are consistently better off than the rest of Canada.
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FIGURE 7: THE EFFECT OF A 20-PER-CENT APPRECIATION ON EACH PROVINCE’S GDP
(a) Export Elasticity of 0.00 (b) Export Elasticity of -0.25
(c) Export Elasticity of -0.50 (d) Export Elasticity of -1.00
Note: Each graph plots, for a different exchange-rate elasticity of exports, the percentage change in provincial GDP due to a
20-per-cent appreciation of the dollar. We estimate this effect from the sectoral change in output (see Table 2) and
each province’s GDP in the three sectors. See text for details.
Before concluding, two important caveats are in order. First, this exercise does not provide a
precise estimate of how a currency appreciation will affect each province’s economy, but
merely serves to broadly illustrate which provinces are more or less likely to be adversely
affected. It is, at its core, a partial equilibrium estimate of the effect of currency appreciation
across Canada. A more complex model that incorporates inter-provincial trade, factor mobility,
and estimates of imported inputs by province and sector would be required for a more precise
estimate. Second, these results abstract from the source of the appreciated currency. If Canada’s
dollar increases due to high commodity prices, then Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland
will gain on the one hand from these higher commodity prices, but will lose on the other hand
from a higher dollar. Which effect will dominate is beyond the scope of this paper. Our results
suggest that a higher dollar’s ceteris-paribus effect will improve the relative economic state of
Central Canada. Despite these limitations, we hope this exercise sheds light on the potential
geographic distribution of costs and benefits from a higher dollar.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on these findings, a number of policy recommendations become apparent. First, and
most importantly, the concern expressed by many public figures in Canada (notably Thomas
Mulcair, during the summer of 2012) may not be well founded. It is not obvious that a higher
dollar is detrimental to manufacturing activity in Canada. Our analysis finds that cheaper
access to imported intermediates can nearly offset the negative effect from lower export
demand. This conclusion is also conservative, as we do not incorporate the increased demand
for manufactured goods that a booming commodity sector would create. In fact, recent research
suggests that one-third of the additional inputs required by expanding oil sands production will
originate from Canadian producers in other provinces — nearly 15 per cent in Ontario alone.35
Our analysis abstracts from the productivity-enhancing effects of cheaper access to imported
capital goods. This effect is well known, with approximately one quarter of international
productivity differences coming from variation in relative equipment prices, half of which is
due to trade barriers.36 So, we would recommend all policy-makers temper their claims that
Dutch Disease afflicts the Canadian economy.
Our analysis also suggests more concrete recommendations: Governments should adopt
policies that facilitate easy access to intermediate inputs imported from abroad. This can be as
easy as lowering tariffs on imported goods used by Canadian businesses. Tentative steps were
made in this direction as part of the federal government’s “Economic Action Plan.”
Specifically, the government has committed itself to eliminating tariffs on manufacturing inputs
and machinery and equipment used for manufacturing. This is not an insignificant step, as it
covers approximately $7 billion of imports and saves businesses $410 million a year, but much
more can be done.37 We recommend that tariffs on all imported inputs, not just machinery and
equipment, be eliminated. We further recommend that this benefit be made available to all
Canadian businesses not just manufacturers. With lower import costs, Canadian firms can
become more integrated into global supply chains and enhance their vertical linkages with
other businesses abroad. With greater imported input flows, the positive contribution of a
higher dollar through cheaper imported intermediate inputs will grow. Increased input use from
abroad can significantly help Canada adjust to its new high-dollar reality.
Beyond assisting Canadian businesses’ access to imported inputs, governments can also relax
local content requirements. A recent high-profile example of this type of regulation can be
found in Ontario’s Green Energy Act of 2009 and the FIT (Feed-in-Tariff) program it
established. This legislation requires a large portion of equipment used to generate renewable
energy be produced within Ontario.38 These measures are so stringent, and so contrary to
Canada’s trade obligations, that they have sparked an international dispute within the WTO.39
35 Alan Arcand, Michael Burt and Todd Crawford, “Fuel for Thought: The Economic Benefits of Oil Sands Investment
for Canada’s Regions,” The Conference Board of Canada, October 24, 2012.
36 Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum, “Trade in Capital Goods,” European Economic Review 45(7) (2001): 1195-
1235.
37 Economic Action Plan Initiatives: http://plandaction.gc.ca/en/initiative/tariff-relief-manufacturing-inputs-and-
machinery-and-equipment.
38 For a listing of domestic content requirements, see the Ontario Power Authority’s Feed-in-Tariff Program
Interpretations of the Domestic Content Requirements, updated December 14, 2009, at:
http://fit.powerauthority.on.ca/table-final-interpretations.
39 For details, see WTO Dispute DS412. Japan is the complainant, with many third parties participating, including the
United States, the European Union, Australia, Brazil, China, Mexico, and others.
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Putting aside these trade issues, and any arguments for so-called “green jobs,” our analysis
suggests that requirements that firms increase the use of domestically supplied inputs (when
other more effective or efficient alternatives exist abroad) will serve to increase the potential for
a higher dollar to negatively affect economic activity. Limiting the extent of imported inputs will
limit the opportunity for firms to use a higher dollar to access cheaper inputs from abroad. This
will short-circuit the cost- and price-reducing effect of a higher dollar. Without this offsetting
mechanism, lower export demand from a higher dollar will potentially dominate, leading firms
to scale back production and lay off workers. The politics of “buy local” should not be allowed
to prevent Canadian firms from enjoying certain potential benefits of a higher dollar.
We end by noting that Dutch Disease may be a misplaced diagnosis of a significant and very
legitimate observation that Canada’s manufacturing productivity is low relative to the United
States. The data supporting this claim are clear: in constant and comparable dollars, Canada’s
GDP per-hour-worked was just over $46 in 2011, which is far below the U.S. level of over
$60.40 If this gap with the United States were to close completely, the average Canadian worker
would see his or her annual earnings increase by nearly $24,000.41 Our productivity growth
rates have also been consistently lower than the United States. To reverse this dangerous trend,
legislative and regulatory attention should be redirected to other areas.
Some of these areas are well known to economic researchers and policy-makers. Most
importantly for Canada, as a small and generally open economy, is the large increase in
productivity from greater integration into the global economy. This goes beyond improved
access to foreign inputs used by manufacturers discussed earlier, and to free trade in all areas
of economic activity. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA have been clearly
linked to increases in Canadian productivity.42 The government should continue to strive to
remove all remaining barriers to international trade. 
These lessons also apply to more than just imports and exports; increased openness to
investment from abroad should also be a priority.43 The Investment Canada Act allows the
federal government to review any investment in excess of a certain (low) threshold ($330
million in 2012) by a non-Canadian wishing to acquire control of a Canadian firm. Since its
inception, the act has been used to review over 19,000 investment projects in Canada with a
cumulative value of over $1 trillion.44 The review is not transparent, is based on vaguely
defined criteria, and has few avenues for appeal. The government can also use the act for
political purposes, such as when the act was used to block foreign buyers from taking over  
40 Source: OECD Country Statistical Profiles. Available online at http://stats.oecd.org. 
41 This calculation is based on 1,700 hours of work for an average worker, per year.
42 See, for example: Daniel Trefler, “The Long and Short of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement” (2004); Alla
Lileeva and Daniel Trefler, “Improved Access to Foreign Markets Raises Plant-level Productivity… For Some
Plants” (2010); Loris Rubini, “Productivity During the Auto Pact and the Free Trade Agreement Between Canada and
the United States,” Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2011; Marc Melitz and Daniel Trefler, “Gains from Trade
when Firms Matter,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 26(2) (2012): 91-118.
43 For an analysis of Canada’s restrictive foreign-investment policies and the potential productivity effect, see: Kristelle
Audet and Robert Gagne, “Openness to Foreign Direct Investment and Productivity in Canada,” Center for
Productivity and Prosperity publication, October 2010,
http://cpp.hec.ca/cms/assets/documents/recherches_publiees/PP-2010-01_FDI_ANG.pdf.
44 ICA’s Quarterly Statistics for 2012 – Quarter 2, Table 1 and Table 2. These statistics reflect operations under the
Investment Canada Act and can be found online at: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/h_lk00015.html.
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MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates and Potash Corporation, and in the delayed reviews of
foreign bids for Progress Energy and Nexen. To improve access to capital, and ensure that
Canadian firms are efficiently operated, our capital markets must become more open.
There are also domestic reforms that can serve to improve Canadian productivity. Related to
our discussion of international trade, lowering barriers to inter-provincial trade can also have
substantial productivity effects. Such barriers are not as obvious as tariffs or quotas across
international borders but are no less real and no less costly. Some recent evidence suggests
internal trade barriers between Canada’s provinces lower national productivity and even
increase income differences between provinces.45 Education is also an obvious candidate where
improvements might be possible, and there may be good reason to think that business
education in particular can have a significant effect on productivity. Improvements in
management knowledge and skill have been linked to productivity increases in the United
States and in Canada.46 Finally, innovation policy has also been cited as the reason for
Canada’s continued decline in global competitiveness. The OECD recently described Canada
as a laggard in terms of research spending by business enterprises, at a rate of only 0.91 per
cent of GDP, well below the typical OECD country’s rate.47 These reforms may or may not be
the most pressing, but it is clear that Canadian policy-makers have many options to increase
overall productivity.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis highlights the importance of recognizing that, in Canada, a large portion of
intermediate inputs are imported. With a higher-value dollar, imported inputs become cheaper
and production costs (and output prices) decline in response. This potentially offsets a large
portion of the negative effect of currency appreciation from lower export demand. Depending
on the sensitivity of export flows to the dollar, the positive contribution of cheaper intermediate
inputs and lower prices may actually lead to an increase in manufacturing output and,
therefore, employment. We find that within a reasonable range of export sensitivities, this is
indeed a possibility. 
45 Trevor Tombe and Jennifer Winter, “Internal Trade and Aggregate Productivity,” Laurier Centre for Economic
Research and Policy Analysis Research Paper 2012-02, 2012.
46 Michelle Alexopoulos and Trevor Tombe, “Management Matters,” Journal of Monetary Economics 59(3) (2011):
269-285; and Michelle Alexopoulos and Trevor Tombe, “Managerial Knowledge and Canadian Productivity,”
working paper, University of Calgary, 2012.
47 For a full report, see http://www.oecd.org/sti/sti-outlook-2012-canada.pdf. 
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